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Abstract. We study intransitive temporal logic implementing multi-
agent's approach and formalizing knowledge and uncertainty. An inno-
vative point here is usage of non-transitive linear time and multi-valued
models - the ones using separate valuations Vj for agent's knowledge of
facts and summarized (agreed) valuation together with rules for com-
putation truth values for compound formulas. The basic mathematical
problems we study here are - decidability and decidability w.r.t. ad-
missible rules. First, we study general case - the logic with non-uniform
intransitivity and solve its decidability problem. Also we consider a mod-
ication of this logic - temporal logic with uniform non-transitivity and
solve problem of recognizing admissibility in this logic.
Keywords: temporal logic, multi-agent's logic,
non-transitive time, deciding algorithms, knowledge,
admissible rules.
1 Introduction
In the area of applications logic to Computer Science worthy place is occupied by
temporal logic. It works very eciently in various subdivisions of CS, Information
Sciences and KR. An important version of temporal logic for CS, { LTL { linear
temporal logic (with UNTIL and NEXT), was introduced by Z. Manna, and
A. Pnueli in late 1980'. Since then, many impressive results concerning pure
logical properties of LTL (e.g. decidability and axiomatization) were obtained
(cf. e.g. Gabbay and Hodkinson[9{11], Vardi [26, 27]). An essential component
of information sciences is the notion of knowledge - a highly reliable information
which is collected up to the moment and has some particular importance.
2The approach to concept of knowledge in CS via multi-agent environment,
when the knowledge to be obtained via agent's discussions, cooperation, eval-
uations, computational experiments, etc. formed a solid branch in CS (cf. e.g.
[29{31], [14, 5]). An interpretation of knowledge in a multi-agent logic with dis-
tances was oered in Rybakov et al [22]), an algorithm solving satisability
problem was found. Concept of Chance Discovery in multi-agent's environment
was studied in Rybakov [23, 24]), a logic dening uncertainty via agents opin-
ions was studied in McLean et al [15]). Representation of agent's interaction as a
dual of the logical operation formalizing common knowledge (which earlier was
suggested in Fagin et al [7]) was elaborated in Rybakov [21, 20].
Approach to model knowledge in terms of symbolic logic appeared (probably
rst time) in Hintikka [13] in his book Knowledge and Belief. Now the eld of
knowledge representation and reasoning about knowledge in logical framework is
very popular area. Various modal and multi-modal logics were used for modeling
agents reasoning. In particular, multi-modal logics were used for this purpose
in Balbiani et al [6], Vakarelov [28], Fagin et al [7], Rybakov [17, 20]. Modern
study of knowledge and believes in terms of single-modal logic was undertaken
in Halpern et al [12].
Concept of justication in terms of epistemic logic makes an another view-
angle on knowledge (cf. e.g.. Artemov et al [2, 3]). The problem of rational agents
and its eect to logical omniscience problem is studied recently (cf. Artemov, et
al [1]).
This our paper investigates intransitive temporal logic implementing multi-
agent's approach and formalizing knowledge and uncertainty in this framework.
An innovative point here is usage of non-transitive linear time and multi-valued
models - the ones using separate valuations Vj for agent's knowledge of facts
and summarized (agreed) valuation and rules for computation truth valued for
compound formulas. We illustrate how the notion of knowledge and uncertainty
might be represented in such framework. The basic mathematical problems we
study here are the fundamental ones for any logical system - decidability and
decidability w.r.t. admissible rules. First we consider very general case - the logic
with non-uniform intransitivity and solve its decidability problem. The problem
of recognizing admissible rules in this logic remains open. Next, we consider a
modication of this logic - temporal logic with uniform non-transitivity and solve
problem of recognizing admissibility in this logic.
2 Notation, Logical Language, Brief Motivation
To make our paper easy readable (without looking for external literature) we
very briey recall necessary denitions and notation. The language of Linear
Temporal Logic (LTL in sequel) extends the language of Boolean logic by oper-
ations N (next) and U (until).
Formation rules for LTL-formulas built up from a set Prop of propositional
letters are as follows: any letter of Prop is a formula. The set of all formulas is
closed w.r.t. applications of Boolean operations, the unary operation N (next)
3and the binary operation U (until). Informal interpretation of the formula N'
is: ' holds in the next time point (state). A formula 'U has meaning: ' will
be true until  rst time will be true. Standard semantic models for LTL are
the following innite linear Kripke structures.
A model is a quadruple M := hN ;;Next; V i, where N is the set of all
natural numbers; is the standard linear order onN , Next is the binary relation,
where a Next b is true i b is the number next to a, that is b = a+ 1.
The valuation V for a set of letters P  Prop is a mapping which assigns
truth values to elements of S. That is, for any p 2 S, V (p)  N . The set V (p)
is the set of all n from N where p is true (w.r.t. V ).
The triple hN ;;Nexti from the above is said to be a Kripke frame (which
we will denote in sequel for short by N ). For any Kripke model M, the truth
values via V for the propositional letters are extended to arbitrary formulas as
follows:
8p 2 Prop (M; a) V p , a 2 N ^ a 2 V (p);
(M; a) V (' ^  ) , (M; a) V ' ^ (M; a) V  ;
(M; a) V :' , not[(M; a) V '];
(M; a) VN' , 8b[(a Next b) ) (M; b) V '];
(M; a) V ('U ) , 9b[(a  b) ^ ((M; b) V  )^
8c[(a  c < b) ) (M; c) V ']]:
A formula ' is said to be valid in the modelM (denotation {M ') if, for
any b from M (b 2 N ), (M; b) V '. The linear temporal logic LTL is the set
of all formulas which are valid in all models.
The aim of our paper is to investigate linear logic with intransitive time.
Therefore we briey motivated our assumption about non-transitivity. Why we
may assume that time might be non-transitive, what we mean by that? Here we
consider time as a computational resource (e.g. its admitted length), as an indi-
vidual human perception of time, as a background for collection and elicitation
of knowledge.
Let us start from the individual perception of time in our human memory.
We sense time as a sequence of events which we remember, we perceive it as a
linear discrete succession (since we do not memorize very many events within
few seconds). Our human memory if limited, nite. This means that what we
knew and remembered a year ago might not be in our memory now; what we
knew ten years ago may be not remembered by us a year ago. This says about
intransitivity of human memory about time events in past.
Consider now computational aspect of time as a resource for analysis of
results. Time events while computational runs may be recorded in protocols of
computation for inspection and references. Any protocol is a nite sequence of
records and not all necessary information might be found there. Though protocol
may give references to other older protocols recorded in earlier computations.
Here the time in applicational (not philosophical) aspect looks as non-transitive.
Assume that we work with extraction of data from databases. Data may be
recorded in DBs and the storage of any one is nite. Any DB is recorded during
4a nite interval of time and may be incomplete. The procedure of updating DBs
is a sequence of actions in time. This sequence may have terminating points, and
what an old DB may contain could be already omitted in the updated one, so
DBs knowledge in time is non-transitive.
Is we consider multi-agents reasoning than time events may be viewed
as an individual ones (with eects as pointed above) and else this multi-agents
brings its own eects. E.g. the amount of agents participating in taking decisions
may be changed during some intervals of time; it might be not-uniform and to
swell the same as to shrink. The priority of experts views may be changed, etc.
And if experts view on truth of a statement was armative ve years ago it may
be opposite now. So, agents knowledge in time environment looks as intransitive.
3 Temporal Multi-Agent's Modes, Temporal Logic
Our approach is based on non-transitive temporal logic LTLNT and technique
allowing to nd its decision algorithm (cf. Rybakov [25]). We start from giving
precise denition of our new, modied models and description of rules for com-
putation truth values of formulas. Then we rst comment how these new models
may represent multi-agent information, knowledge and uncertainty, give some
illustrating examples.
Denition 1. An intransitive linear frame is a tuple
F := hN;;Next;
[
j2N
[Rj ]i;
components of which are as follows.
{ N =
S
i2InN [i;mi] ([i;mi] is the interval of all natural numbers situated
between i and mi). The set In is a set of indexes - it is a subset of N ;
{ 8i1; i2 2 In, i1 6= i2 ) (i1;mi1) \ (i2;mi2) = ;;
{ 8i 2 In (mi > i); for any j 2 [i;mi] any Rj is the standard linear order on
the interval [j;mi];
{ Next is the standard NEXT relation on N : n Next m if m = n+ 1.
For the sequel we x notation: t(i) := mi - boundary of transitivity for i.
The multi-agent's models M on such frames F are dened by xing valuations
Vi; i 2 A; jjAjj < 1 for a set of letters P - agents valuations for truth of letters
p 2 P , { , i.e. 8i; 8p 2 P; Vi(p)  N .
A is a set of indexes for agents, for each model it may be dierent (any
model may have its own xed agents, their quantity may be dierent). For all
n, n 2 Vi(p) is interpreted as p is true at the state n by opinion of the agent i.
Also we consider the agreed (global) valuation V for letters from P : {
V(p) = fn j n 2 N; jjfi j i 2 A;n 2 Vi(p)gjj > kg;
where k is a xed rational number (for this given model), which is bigger than
jjAjj=2.
5That is k is the threshold, which shows that the number of the agents which
are sure that p is true in the given state (world) is big enough, bidder than half.
The particular value of k may vary from model to model - each one has its
own threshold. Now any such model M is a multi-valued model - with a nite
number of dierent valuations.
The logical language for our logic based at such models is an extension of the
one for LTL from previous section. We extend it by agent's knowledge operations
Ai; i 2 A applied to only letters - for all p 2 P;Ai(p) is a formula. We introduce
rules for computation truth on models M for formulas as follows. For letters
and boolean operations it is standard: 8p 2 P; 8n 2 N; (F ; n) V p ,p 2
V (p); (F ; n) V  ^  , [(F ; n) V  and (F ; n) V ]; etc. For operation N -
next, it is standard again:
8n 2 N; (M; n) VN' , [(n Next m) ) (M;m) V ']:
But U - until operation, and agents operations work in a non-standard way,
since the models are intransitive and since agents truth operations work as nom-
inals. We suggest the following rules:
Denition 2. For any formulas ' and  ,
8n 2 N; (M; n) V (' U  ) ,
9m[(nRnm) ^ ((M;m) V  ) ^ 8k[(n  k < m))(M; k) V ']];
8n 2 N;8i 2 A; (M; n) VAi(p) , n 2 Vi(p):
The agent's knowledge operations Ai, as we see, are applied to only
letters but not to temporal compound formulas. The reason for it is as follows.
The origin of the problem comes from our denition of models as multi-valued
models (when each agent has own valuation of propositional letters; but we see
that approach is very natural and well corresponding to multi-agents reasoning).
If we would allow the operations Ai to be freely applied to arbitrary com-
pound formulas and sub-formulas, then usage them in temporal (and modal)
formulas would immediate cause clash/conict in computation truth values.
E.g. if we have a formula Ai(') with temporal formula ', we either have
to redene truth values for letters p always in now and future (which means
to ignore knowledge of other agents), or to resolve what to do with all other
possible agent's sub-formulas Aj(pm) w.r.t. the agent i. Thus, it might be that
we need to give some agents a preference, but it is not clear what for to make
an advantage to some ones. So, because this uncertainty, we prefer to let these
cobwebs for future research and to study rst this basic case.
It is easy to accept that this approach correspond well to our intuition about
multi-agent information and time. The agents have own knowledge about facts,
we code it by Ai(p). But the rules for computation compound formulas are
already objective, general and global, the same for all agents. Though, to consider
6dierent rules for computation truth values for compound, nested formulas {
looks as an attractive and promising idea.
The logic we wish to introduce is the collection of all general statements,
formulas which are valid in all models.
Denition 3. The multi-agent non-transitive logic TMAInt is the set of all for-
mulas which are valid in all models M.
This logic is temporal, and therefore we may dene via U the modal op-
erations 2 and 3 in standard way: 3' := >U'; 2' := :3:': The logic is
intransitive which allows such formulas as e.g.
2p ^3N:p
to be satisable. Indeed - it is sucient to take the model with all mi   i = 3
and p to be true on the interval [1; 2; 3] and to be false elsewhere.
The understanding (formal denition(s)) of knowledge, uncertainty and plau-
sibility may be convincingly interpreted if we will consider the models with time
and NEXT directed to past (not to future). We may easy agree that knowledge
is coming from past, but not from the future.
The past time - in our human memory (or in storage of information in DBs
from previous experience, length of protocols for completed computations, etc)
evidently looks as non-transitive. Indeed, any database contains records stored
in a nite amount of time, though it may contain information where to look for
earlier events (so to say - to use NEXT - pointer to a new time interval).
We may understand knowledge as facts, statements which are convincingly
true for all period of time which we remember (at least for leading part of experts,
agents). This locally, in models, to be expressed by formula 2': ' was always
true in past for dominating parts of experts (agents).
Then, the uncertainty (in this approach), may be interpreted as e.g. 3' ^
3:' - in some time points we remember agent's view for truth of ' was sup-
portive, and in some - the opinion of a majority was against. So, the truth for '
in the interval of time which we remember was uncertain, not stable. Consider
some more subtle example:
2[('! [3:' _N:']) ^ (:'! [3' _N'])]:
This formula expresses more delicate statement about uncertainty of truth values
for ' - it always oscillates.
Plausibility of ' may be interpreted, e.g., as follows: :' ^ N2': today
experts hesitate about truth of ', but always before today (admittedly - long
time) they accepted it to be true. More example:
2' ^23N2:':
This formula says that ' is very plausible - as long as we remember with con-
dence, it was true, but in 2 steps above our reliable capacity of memory for past
it was a state where it was false with some evidence.
7Many similar interpretations reecting various subtleties of understanding
uncertainty and plausibility may be suggested via this approach (e.g. using pref-
erence in opinion of most knowledgeable agents, and so forth).
3.1 Technical part, decidability algorithm of TMAInt
Now we turn to main technical problems solved in this paper, rst we consider
decidability of TMAInt. We will use here the approach from Rybakov [25] ex-
tending it for agent's knowledge operations.
An essential part of this approach is usage of the normal reduced forms for
formulas, more exactly for inference rules to which formulas may be converted.
It is very useful because it allows to avoid complicated calculations and evalu-
ations for nested formulas. We will use reduction of formulas to inference rules
(sequents). An inference rule is a sequent compound from the premises and the
conclusion:
r :=
'1(x1; : : : ; xn); : : : ; 'l(x1; : : : ; xn)
 (x1; : : : ; xn)
:
Here '1(x1; : : : ; xn); : : : ; 'l(x1; : : : ; xn) and  (x1; : : : ; xn) are formulas constructed
out of letters (variables) x1; : : : ; xn. This rule formalizes simplest reasoning step:
 (x1; : : : ; xn) (which is called conclusion) follows (logically follows) from all for-
mulas '1(x1; : : : ; xn); : : : ; 'l(x1; : : : ; xn) .
Denition 4. We say that a rule r is valid in a model M if and only if the
following holds:
[8n ((M; n) V
^
1il
'i)]) [8m ((M;m) V  )]:
Otherwise we say r is refuted in M, or refuted inM by V , and write M 1V
r. A rule r is valid in a frame F (notation F r) if it is valid in any model
based at F .
Usage of inference rules for decidability problem (verication if a formula is
a theorem for our logic) is based at the following simple fact. Given a formula
', we transform ' into the rule x! x='. Then it is evident that
Lemma 1. Formula ' is a theorem of TMAInt (that is ' 2 TMAInt) i the
rule (x! x=') is valid in any frame F .
Thus, we bring decidability of formulas to decidability of rules; but surpris-
ingly it simplies the problem. We will use the rules in the reduced form.
Denition 5. We say that a rule r has reduced normal form if
r = "=x1 where
" :=
_
1jl
[
^
1in
x
t(j;i;0)
i ^
^
1in
(Nxi)
t(j;i;1) ^
^
m2A; 1in
(Amxi)
t(j;m;i;1)^
8^
1i;kn;i6=k
(xiUxk)
t(j;i;k;1)]
always t(j; i;m); t(j; i; k; 1); t(j;m; i; 1) 2 f0; 1g and, for any formula  above,
0 := , 1 := :.
Denition 6. A rule rnf in reduced normal form is a normal reduced form for
a given rule r i, for any frame F for TMAInt, F  r , F  rnf :
Theorem 1. For any given rule r we can construct in (single) exponential time
some it's reduced normal form rnf .
Proof is rather simple and short. It is sucient to specify the language of
our logic to the general algorithm described in e.g. Lemma 5 from [4] and to
follow closely its proof. We may consider the rules with only single premise, so
let r = = be an inference rule. For r, Sub(r) be the set of all subformulas of
r. We need a set of new variables Z = fz j  2 Sub(r)g.
Let us consider the rule in the intermediate form:
rif = z ^
^
2Sub(r)nV ar(r)
(z $ ])=z ;
where
] =
(
z  z when  =    for  2 f^;_;!;Ug.
z when  =  for  2 f:;N; Am;m 2 Ag;
The rules r and rif are equivalent w.r.t. truth at any model. Indeed, suppose
M , be a model with a valuation V over its frame such that M 6V r. Then
M V  and there exists an element w 2 N , such that (M;w) 6V . Let W be
the valuation dened as follows: W (z) = V (). It is straightforward to show
that M W z ^
V
2Sub(r)nV ar(r)(z $ ]). In addition, (M;w) 6W z .
For the other direction, supposeM W z^
Vfz $ ] j  2 Sub(r)nV ar(r)g
and (M;w) 6W z , for some valuation W : Z ! 2N and some w 2 N . Dene
V : V ar(r)! 2N by V (xi) =W (zxi). It follows directly that for all  2 Sub(r),
V () =W (z). Thus M V , (M;w) 6V , hence M 6V r.
Finally, we transform the premise of the obtained rule rif into a perfect
disjunctive normal form over primitives of the form xi, Nxi, Amxi and xiUxj .
This requires no more than exponential time on the number of variables, i.e.,
on the number of sub-formulas of the original rule (the same as for reduction of
any boolean formula to the perfect disjunctive normal form). Q.E.D.
Based at this reduction of formulas to rules in reduced forms and technique
borrowed from Rybakov [25] we may prove
Theorem 2. The satisability problem for TMAInt is decidable. There is an
algorithm which, for any given formula, veries its satisability, and computes
a valuation satisfying it in a special nite model F(N(r)) if it is satisable (at
next stage we can transform this model in a standard innite model).
9Here we extend the proof from [25] to adopt usage of agents knowledge operations
Am (following closely to the original proof). Thus, the logic TMAInt is decidable;
this is rst main technical result of our paper.
4 Problem of Admissibility
Far the more complicated decidability problem is decidability w.r.t. admissible
inference rules. We would like to study admissibility problem for a logics from
suggested background. Recall that a rule
r :=
'1(x1; : : : ; xn); : : : ; 'l(x1; : : : ; xn)
 (x1; : : : ; xn)
;
is said to be admissible in a logic L if, for every tuple of formulas, 1; : : : ; n,
we have  (1; : : : ; n) 2 L whenever 8i ['i(1; : : : ; n) 2 L]:
The solution of the admissibility problem for the logic LTL itself (i.e. nding
an algorithm recognizing admissibility of inference rules) was obtained in Ry-
bakov, 2008, [19] (cf. also [18]), basis for rules admissible in LTL was found in
Babenyshev and Rybakov, 2011, [4].
We have to specify the notion of admissibility for inference rules in our multi-
agent's logics because we use agent's knowledge operations Ai which cannot be
used above nested formulas.
Denition 7. A given rule
r :=
'1(x1; : : : ; xn); : : : ; 'l(x1; : : : ; xn)
 (x1; : : : ; xn)
;
is said to be admissible in the logic TMAInt if, for every tuple of formulas,
1; : : : ; n, we have  (1; : : : ; n) 2 TMAInt whenever 8i ['i(1; : : : ; n) 2
TMAInt], where for any xi above if xi has at least one occurrence in r in form
Aj(xi) then i = xi.
The restriction for substitutions above is necessary since our multi-agent logic
cannot admit nested formulas bounded by agent's knowledge operations Aj . A
restriction for substitutions in dening admissibility was already considered in
literature (cf. for instance, - Odintsov, Rybakov - [16]). We currently cannot
answer the question about recognizing admissibility in the logic TMAInt from
previous section, but we are able to do it for its restricted version - the one for
models with bounded intransitivity.
Denition 8. A temporal frame F with uniform non-transitivity m is a partic-
ular case of frames for TMAInt
F := hN;;Next;
[
i2N
[Ri]i
given in Denition 1 in Section 3, when any interval [i; t(i)], has length m, where
m is a xed natural number (measure of intransitivity).
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So, the only distinction from our general case in the previous section is that
instead of arbitrary measure on intransitivity mi for any world i, we consider
the same and xed one - m. It looks as we assume that models (objective world),
not agents, always must remember the same interval of the time in past - the one
with length m. Then we dene models on such frames as we did earlier above
(bearing in mind the presence multi-agent's valuations for agent's knowledge
about truth the facts and agreed truth valuation V ).
Denition 9. The logic TMAInt;m is the set of all formulas which are valid at
any model M with the measure of intransitivity m.
The denition of admissibility for inference rules in this logic is exactly the
same as we dened above in this section for TMAInt. It seems that to consider
and to discuss such logic is reasonable, since we may put limitations on the size
of time intervals that agents (experts) may introspect in future (or to remember
in past). An easy observation concerning the logic TMAInt;m itself is that it is
decidable: it is trivial (since for verication if a formula of temporal degree k is
a theorem of TMAInt;m we will need to check it on only initial part of the frames
consisting only k + 1 subsequent intervals of length m). One more immediate
observation is:
Proposition 1. TMAInt;m * TMAInt for all m.
Proof is evident since
(
^
im
[p ^Nip] ! 2p) 2 TMAInt;m:
The main technical result of this section is solution of the admissibility prob-
lem for logics TMAInt;m.
Theorem 3. For any m, the linear temporal logic with uniform non-transitivity
TMAInt;m is decidable w.r.t. admissibility of inference rules.
The proof is essentially other than the one for decidability w.r.t. admissible
rules of the linear (transitive) temporal logic LTL itself (given in [19]). Presence
of innite sequence intransitivity intervals in the models makes the case dierent.
5 Open problems
We think the following open questions could be of interest:
(i) Decidability of TMAInt itself w.r.t. admissible inference rules.
(ii) Decidability w.r.t. admissible rules of the variant of TMAInt;m with non-
uniform intransitivity, when intransitivity intervals are of length at most m, but
the length may be dierent.
(iii) The problems of axiomatization for TMAInt and TMAInt;m are open.
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